Novel influenza A viruses of animal origin (eg, avian or swine) have caused sporadic human infections that have resulted in a wide spectrum of illness severity. Avian influenza A viruses circulate widely and are continuously evolving among wild waterfowl, with the potential for emergence of antigenically and genetically distinct novel influenza A viruses [1] . Vigilant surveillance of these emerging viruses is critical because it is not possible to predict which will gain the ability for zoonotic transmission and, more important, acquire the ability to be transmitted between humans. Human infections with novel influenza A viruses are of global public health concern because there may be little or no population immunity; these viruses may cause severe disease; and if there is sustained, efficient human-to-human transmission, a global pandemic may result. Pandemics caused by novel influenza A viruses include the devastating 1918 H1N1 pandemic, which killed an estimated 50-100 million persons worldwide [2] , as well as the 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2, and 2009 H1N1 pandemics.
Antiviral medications have a potentially important role in treatment and prevention of human illness from novel influenza A virus infections. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommendations for the use of antiviral medications in the treatment and chemoprophylaxis of novel influenza A virus infections have evolved in response to the emergence of novel influenza A viruses of avian origin, both globally and in the United States [3] [4] [5] . The goal of CDC guidance is early treatment of ill persons to reduce the risk of disease progression and development of serious complications from infection with novel influenza A viruses, as well as to potentially reduce viral shedding and transmission. In addition, postexposure chemoprophylaxis guidance aims to reduce illness of persons after exposure to infected persons and reduce the possibility that a novel influenza A virus will adapt and acquire the ability to spread efficiently between humans.
The CDC first developed guidance for the use of antiviral agents for the treatment and chemoprophylaxis of novel influenza A viruses in 2004 in response to the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) in poultry and waterfowl, followed by human cases in several countries. As new viruses have been identified and more data have become available, recommendations have evolved. In particular, in response to avian influenza A(H7N9), postexposure chemoprophylaxis recommendations were revised in 2013. The current CDC antiviral guidance-and this commentary-focuses on treatment and postexposure antiviral chemoprophylaxis for novel influenza A viruses associated with severe human disease, generally defined as causing illness that often results in hospitalization for severe pneumonia, with fatal outcomes reported. These viruses include HPAI A(H5N1) and low-pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9), which have caused many cases of human infection.
Current guidance may also be applied to related avian influenza A viruses with potential to cause severe human disease but for which relatively few or no cases of human infection have been reported; these include HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses, which have been identified in North America, and viruses such as HPAI A(H5N6) and LPAI (H10N8), which have been known to cause fatal human disease but for which the epidemiology and risk of severe illness remain poorly understood [6] [7] [8] . Novel swine-origin viruses such as variant viruses A(H3N2)v, (H1N1)v, and (H1N2)v have been detected in the United States [9] ; because these infections have been associated mostly with mild human illness and very low mortality, clinical management of variant virus infection is similar to management of seasonal influenza virus infections and is not addressed in this article [10] . In this commentary, we aim to provide the background and rationale for the CDC's current antiviral use guidance in the setting of human infections with novel influenza A viruses associated with severe illness [3, 4] .
HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA A(H5N1) VIRUS
Human infection with HPAI A(H5N1) virus can cause severe pneumonia, multiorgan failure, and fatal illness [11, 12] . Circulation of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses among poultry is considered enzootic in parts of Asia and the Middle East, with epizootic spread in other regions [13] . The first human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) viruses were identified in 1997; reemergence of human infections was reported in 2003 and as of 19 December 2016, these viruses have caused 856 reported human infections in 16 countries [14] . Many human infections have been associated with severe illness; at least 452 (53%) of the reported infections have resulted in death [14] . Most persons were infected after direct contact with sick or dead poultry or visiting a live poultry market [15] , and clusters of cases have occurred, with some cases likely due to limited, nonsustained human-to-human transmission [12, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] .
Guidance for antiviral treatment and chemoprophylaxis of HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections was developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2004, with input from the CDC and other partners; subsequent updates and modifications were made as more evidence became available [12, [20] [21] [22] . The CDC and other agencies, including the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and Public Health England, developed similar guidance [23, 24] . Treatment with the neuraminidase inhibitor (NAI) oral oseltamivir was recommended as early as possible for all suspected human infections. Randomized controlled trials of NAI treatment in outpatients have established efficacy of early treatment (within 48 hours of symptom onset) of uncomplicated seasonal influenza [25] [26] [27] , and some studies indicate that NAI treatment can reduce symptom duration, viral shedding, and transmission to household members if administered later after illness onset [29, 30] . Oseltamivir treatment of hospitalized patients with HPAI A(H5N1) has been associated with decreased mortality, with benefit demonstrated when treatment was initiated late (up to 6-8 days) after symptom onset [12, 30, 31] .
The standard dose of oseltamivir for treatment of adults with seasonal influenza is 75 mg by mouth or nasogastric tube twice daily. However, WHO guidance for treatment of HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection suggested that it was reasonable to consider a higher dose of oral oseltamivir (eg, 150 mg twice daily in adults) because very high levels of HPAI A(H5N1) virus replication had been observed and some HPAI A(H5N1) viruses had decreased sensitivity to oseltamivir, as indicated by high IC 50 values (ie, drug concentration needed to inhibit 50% of neuraminidase enzyme activity) [32] [33] [34] . In addition, the development of oseltamivir resistance during oseltamivir treatment with standard dose was noted in 2 patients, both of whom died [35] , and it was thought that higher doses might improve antiviral efficacy and decrease the likelihood that resistance may develop. However, several more recent studies have not demonstrated virologic or clinical advantages with higher treatment doses [36] [37] [38] [39] . The HPAI A(H5N1) guidance also noted that treatment for a period longer than the standard 5-day duration (eg, for a total of 10 days) might be necessary [12, 30] , although this has not been rigorously evaluated.
The value of inhaled zanamivir treatment was noted to be uncertain (and remains unclear) because of a lack of data in the treatment of human disease from HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection. In addition, inhaled zanamivir has shown lower bioavailability outside of the respiratory tract compared with oral oseltamivir [40] and thus may be less effective in the setting of extrapulmonary dissemination of human infection with HPAI A(H5N1) virus [12, 22, 41, 42] . However, intravenous zanamivir, if available, may have a role in the treatment of illness caused by infection with oseltamivir-or peramivir-resistant but zanamivir-susceptible HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection [43, 44] .
In the WHO guidance to prevent human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) virus, targeted postexposure antiviral chemoprophylaxis was recommended for specific exposure groups stratified by risk of infection [22] . For seasonal influenza, randomized trials have shown postexposure antiviral chemoprophylaxis with neuraminidase inhibitors to be approximately 70%-90% effective in preventing illness from influenza virus infection among household members [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] . In the HPAI A(H5N1) guidance, it was recommended that high-risk exposure groups (ie, household or close family contacts of confirmed cases) should be administered postexposure antiviral chemoprophylaxis, whereas for moderate-risk exposure groups, such as healthcare personnel with unprotected close contact, it was recommended that postexposure chemoprophylaxis might be administered. It was advised that postexposure chemoprophylaxis should probably not be administered to low-risk exposure groups, which included healthcare workers who used appropriate personal protective equipment during exposure to infected patients [22] . The recommended dosing and duration for postexposure chemoprophylaxis was the same as that for seasonal influenza. For adults, this was once-daily administration of oral oseltamivir 75 mg for 7-10 days after the last known exposure; this time period was chosen to cover both an extended incubation period and the longest incubation period reported for human-to-human transmission [12, 16] .
EMERGENCE OF LOW-PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA A(H7N9) VIRUS
In March 2013, LPAI A(H7N9) virus infection was identified in 3 persons in eastern China [50] ; additional LPAI A(H7N9) cases were reported over the next several months across multiple provinces in eastern China [51] , with >800 cases identified in northern, eastern, and southern China during 2013 through December 2016 [6] . Since the emergence of LPAI A(H7N9) in 2013, annual epidemics of human infection with LPAI A(H7N9) viruses have been identified in China, with these roughly corresponding with the timing of seasonal influenza epidemics in most of China. Most cases of human infection with LPAI A(H7N9) virus have had contact with infected poultry, usually by visiting a live poultry market [52] , or, as is seen increasingly frequently in recent seasons, through direct or indirect contact with domestically raised backyard poultry [53] . Clusters of LPAI A(H7N9) human infections have been detected where limited, probable, nonsustained human-to-human transmission has been reported [52, 54, 55] . Extrapolating from the number of LPAI A(H7N9) virus infections identified since 2013, LPAI A(H7N9) viruses appear to be more easily transmissible from birds to humans than HPAI A(H5N1) viruses [55, 56] .
LPAI A(H7N9) virus infection can cause severe and fatal human illness; of the 808 persons infected with LPAI A(H7N9) virus reported to WHO as of 19 December 2016, at least 322 (40%) died [6] . Lower respiratory tract disease and multisystem organ failure have been noted frequently in patients with LPAI A(H7N9) virus infection [57] , who have generally been older and more likely to have underlying medical conditions than those infected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus [58] . Mildly ill cases have been noted, although they are less likely to be captured by surveillance [55] .
Interim guidance for the use of influenza antiviral agents for treatment of human infections with LPAI A(H7N9) viruses was first issued by the CDC in the spring of 2013 [3] . This guidance was subsequently modified to be more broadly applicable to human infections with any novel influenza A viruses associated with severe human disease ( Table 1 ) and, for the CDC, replaced the guidance previously developed for HPAI A(H5N1). In Table 1 [58] .
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b For detailed guidance, see [8] .
c For case definitions for specific viruses, please see [59] .
d Longer courses of treatment (eg, 10 days) should be considered for severely ill hospitalized patients with infections with novel influenza A viruses that cause severe disease.
e For outpatients with uncomplicated disease in whom fever is absent and symptoms are nearly resolved, decisions to initiate antiviral treatment should be based on clinical judgment. Persons who are not treated with antiviral medications should be monitored for progression of illness.
f The recommendation for uncomplicated seasonal influenza is 1 dose of intravenous peramivir for 1 day. For treatment of novel influenza A viruses, a single intravenous infusion is not recommended. Until evidence is available, if peramivir treatment is chosen, it should be given daily for at least 5 days.
g For detailed guidance, see [4, 5] .
h Decisions to initiate antiviral chemoprophylaxis should be based on clinical judgment, with consideration given to the type of exposure and to whether the exposed person is at high risk for complications from influenza [58] .
addition to LPAI A(H7N9) and HPAI A(H5N1) viruses, this guidance may also be applied to the HPAI A(H5N6) virus, which has caused 16 reported human infections in China since 2014, 6 of which were fatal [6, 7] , and to LPAI A(H10N8) viruses, which have also been associated with fatal human disease [8] . The guidance also applies to other newly detected avian influenza H5 viruses with the potential to cause human infection with severe disease, including the A(H5Nx) viruses identified in North America [3] . This guidance may also apply when novel influenza A viruses are initially detected and the risk of severe disease and transmission among humans is unknown.
CURRENT GUIDANCE
Similar to earlier guidance for human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) viruses, the CDC emphasizes that antiviral treatment of all persons with suspected or confirmed infection should not be delayed while waiting for laboratory confirmation of a novel influenza A virus infection [25] [26] [27] and that treatment should be initiated even if >48 hours has elapsed since illness onset [28] [29] [30] [31] . For uncomplicated illness in outpatients, treatment with oral oseltamivir, inhaled zanamivir, or intravenous peramivir is recommended. For hospitalized patients and patients with complicated illness, treatment with oral oseltamivir is preferentially recommended because of the lack of data for inhaled zanamivir in patients with severe influenza illness. Intravenous peramivir is also available for use in the United States, but its effectiveness in human illness caused by novel influenza A virus infection is not currently known, and it is not recommended for hospitalized patients or those with severe, progressive, or complicated disease who can tolerate or absorb oral or enterically administered oseltamivir. Longer duration of therapy might be needed for prolonged viral replication in patients with severe lower respiratory tract illness. The CDC guidance adapted the previous WHO exposure risk groups for A(H5N1) virus; persons in the highest-risk exposure group are recommended to receive postexposure chemoprophylaxis, whereas postexposure chemoprophylaxis can be considered on the basis of clinical judgment for moderate-risk exposure groups and is not routinely recommended for low-risk exposure groups [4] . In contrast with the earlier antiviral guidance developed for HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection, the dose recommended for postexposure chemoprophylaxis has been increased to 1 dose twice daily instead of the typical chemoprophylaxis regimen of 1 dose once daily. This recommendation for use of the treatment dose for chemoprophylaxis is based on a number of factors. First, the exact period of exposure to an infectious person may be difficult to define and may be ongoing. Therefore, infection could occur after an early exposure, not only the last exposure. If postexposure chemoprophylaxis once-daily dosing is started after infection is established, it would be subtherapeutic and could have adverse clinical consequences and increase the possibility that the virus could develop resistance during exposure to the drug. During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, several reports suggested oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses emerged among persons taking oseltamivir once-daily chemoprophylaxis [60] [61] [62] . Second, early case reports of persons infected with LPAI A(H7N9) viruses reported the development of oseltamivir resistance after oseltamivir treatment [63] [64] [65] . In fact, the emergence of several different neuraminidase mutations in patients with LPAI A(H7N9) virus infection were reported, and virus fitness did not appear to be compromised. This raised the possibility that LPAI A(H7N9) viruses may be more prone to developing resistance during drug exposure; thus, the lower chemoprophylaxis dose could be even less optimal. Finally, ferret studies suggested benefit from higher antiviral chemoprophylaxis dosing for HPAI A(H5N1) virus [66] . Thus, for those persons for whom postexposure chemoprophylaxis is recommended on the basis of their exposure risk group, a treatment dose (twice daily) is recommended instead of the standard once-daily dose. The WHO and Public Health England also subsequently recommended twice-daily NAI dosing for chemoprophylaxis of LPAI A(H7N9) virus infection [67, 68] .
The current guidance for the use of postexposure chemoprophylaxis is based on the desire to balance the risk and benefits of antiviral chemoprophylaxis. By reducing the risk of subtherapeutic dosing in persons with a novel influenza A virus infection before illness develops, twice-daily NAI dosing decreases the risk of development of antiviral resistance, which is important both for an individual patient's clinical course and for broader public health goals. Should ongoing transmission occur of a virus resistant to the most widely available antiviral treatments, the ability to treat infection and prevent the spread of the virus would be severely limited. Also, the risk of adverse events does not increase with twice-daily dosing compared with once-daily dosing [69] . [71, 73] . The HPAI A(H5N1) virus identified in North America was a reassortant virus with genes from HPAI A(H5) Eurasian viruses and low-pathogenic North American viruses; the implications for human disease for this virus and for HPAI A(H5N2) and HPAI A(H5N8) viruses are unknown [71, 73] . To control the outbreak, >50 million birds in commercial and backyard flocks were culled in 2015 [74] , an activity that required hundreds of workers to be potentially exposed to birds infected with these viruses [75] .
Although no human infections with these viruses have been documented [75] , it is assumed North American HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses have the potential to cause severe human illness and, at this time, CDC recommendations for the use of antiviral drugs for the treatment and chemoprophylaxis of human infections with North American HPAI H5 are the same as guidance for infections known to be associated with severe disease, including HPAI A(H5N1) and LPAI A(H7N9) viruses. Human exposure to HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses in the United States has been relatively limited when compared with human exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) and LPAI A(H7N9) viruses in countries where they are endemic in poultry populations, and the risk of human infection with North American HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses remains unknown but is considered low. If additional information becomes available, antiviral guidance for human infections with HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses will be updated accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Antiviral medications play an important role in the treatment and chemoprophylaxis of human infections with novel influenza A viruses associated with severe illness and genetically related viruses with the potential to cause severe human disease. The current CDC recommendations, as summarized in this commentary, are based on currently available information regarding the epidemiology and transmissibility of novel influenza A viruses known to have caused severe human disease and currently available therapeutics. Antiviral treatment and chemoprophylaxis recommendations may evolve as new therapies become available and new viruses emerge that are documented to or have the potential to infect humans. Revised CDC guidance will depend upon the viral characteristics, avian-to-human and human-to-human transmissibility, susceptibility to antiviral medications, and the severity of illness caused by novel influenza A viruses.
